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Ames: Constitutional Law - Right of Indigents to Counsel to Misdemeanor

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Right of Indigents to Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972).

Argersinger, an indigent, was charged with an offense
punishable by imprisonment up to six month and a $1,000
fine. At trial he was not represented by counsel, and was
sentenced to serve 90 days in jail. He brought an action of
habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court, claiming he
could not adequately defend himself at trial because he was
deprived of his right to counsel. The Florida Supreme Court
found that there was no right to court-appointed counsel
where the offense charged was punishable by less than six
months imprisonment.' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.2 In a unanimous decision as to result, the
Court held, "[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented
by counsel at his trial." 8
The American Bar Association Journal called Argersinger, "[T]he one decision of the last term of the Supreme
Court that has the most significance for the legal profession
itself. . . ."' The purpose of this case note is to study the
history of the right-to-counsel principle culminating in Argersinger, and to offer suggestions as to how that principle should
be implemented in Wyoming.
In the United States, the doctrine of right to counsel
stems from the sixth amendment to the Constitution, proclaiming, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." ' It was left to the courts to construe the exact
meaning of the sixth amendment, and to determine just how
far it was to be extended.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Argersinger v. Hamlin- ....... U.S
Id. at 2008.
Id. at 2012.
58 A.B.A.J. 942 (1972).

.

,

92 S. Ct. 2006, 2007 (1972).

5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The first landmark decision was Powell v. Alabama,' in
which the Court held the sixth amendment was made binding
on the states in capital offense cases by reason of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, noting it is the
duty of the court to assign counsel to an indigent defendant
accused of a capital crime, in order to assure a fair trial.
Johnson v. Zerbst extended the meaning of the sixth
amendment in Federal courts beyond the earlier capital offense standard: "The Sixth Amendment withholds from
federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he
has or waives the assistance of counsel."' (Emphasis added).
A major set-back blocked the advancement of the rightto-counsel principle in 1942, however, when the Court found
in Betts v. Brady' that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right," and that due process did not require the
state courts to appoint counsel to indigent defendants. The
Betts Court distinguished the Powell case on its facts, and
observed that the Johnson decision applied only to federal
courts.
For twenty years the United States Supreme Court was
saddled with Betts. In its attempts to expand the right-tocounsel doctrine, the Court was forced to find "special circumsances" in each case in which it wanted to hold that a constitutional right to counsel existed. In Re Oliver9 was a case in
which the defendant had been convicted after a secret one-man
grand jury investigation. Under these facts, Justice Black, for
the majority said, "[A]n opportunity to be heard in his dedefense-a right to his day Wn court-[including the right to
be represented by counsel]-are basic in our system of jurisprudence. . . . ""l In Cash v. Culver the Court set out the
"special circumstances" under which it would apply the sixth
amendment to the states: where there are "factors which may
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7.

304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).

8. 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
9. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
10. Id. at 273.
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render state criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to
result in injustice as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.', 1
In 1963, the Court rendered its second landmark decision
in Gideon v. Wainwright," and finally freed itself from the
restrictions of Betts. The Gideon Court made the sixth
amendment binding on the states in all serious offenses, in
holding that an indigent defendant has a fundamental right
to the assistance of counsel in a criminal trial, and that conviction without the assistance of counsel is a violation of the
fourteenth amendment due process. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Douglas, (who was to write for the majority in Argersinger), stated his belief that there is no constitutional distinction between capital and non-capital cases, and that the
fourteenth amendment requires due process for deprival of
liberty as well as of life. 3 The Gideon case involved a felony.
But seeing Gideon in the larger context of "crime" instead
of "felony" and considering the broad language adopted by
the Court, "it would not . . .have been an indefensible position to suggest that any indigent person charged with a crime
was, by virtue of Gideon, entitled to appointed counsel."' 4
Yet the Court consistently denied certiorari in cases where
state courts had refused to apply Gideon to misdemeanor
prosecutions, and it became "abundantly clear that the Court
believes that Gideon does not, of its own force, include misdemeanor offenses." 5
8 the Court
Five years later, in Duncan v. Louisiana,"
imposed upon the states the duty to recognize the right to
jury trial in misdemeanor cases punishable by over six
months in prison, where the crime charged was not a petty
offense. Many assuned that this would also be the standard
for application of the right to counsel, and indeed Florida
applied the Duncan test in denying Argersinger's right to
counsel.'
11. 358 U.S. 633, 636 (1959).
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1968).
13.

Id.

at 349.

14. Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685,
688 (1968).

15. Id. at 690.
16.

391 U.S. 145 (1968).

17. Argersinger, supra note 1, at 2007.
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Some courts, however, were more creative. In 1969 the
Fifth Circuit, in James v. Headley, said, "Because a charge
ispetty enough to lie outside the jury-trial requirement does
not mean that it is also petty enough to allow suspension of
the right to counsel."' 8 The court noted important distinctions between the right to counsel and the right to jury trial,
finding the right to counsel more fundamental, as it alone
can protect the defendant from such defense problems as introduction of improper evidence, self-incrimination, and the
many procedural pitfalls." In dicta, the court also observed
that there is "no constitutional distinction between felonies
and misdemeanors, between gross and petty offenses, between
the loss of liberty for 181 days and the loss of liberty for 180
or fewer days." 2"
Shortly after the James decision, the Supreme Court of
Oregon, in Stevenson v. Holzman,2 held that no one who has
been denied the assistance of counsel can be deprived of
liberty as a result of any criminal prosecution, including one
for violation of a municipal ordinance. Citing James, the
Oregon court said:
We agree, however, with those courts that
have held that the right to counsel is more essential
to a fair trial than the right to a jury....
Since the Supreme Court has not decided the
question, we must ourselves decide whether the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel extends to prosecutions
for misdemeanors, ....We hold that it does .... 22
The court based its holding on the belief that to avoid conviction of the innocent is the controlling objective in all
courts, and that if indigent misdemeanants in federal courts
have the right to assigned counsel, failure to grant the corresponding right in state courts would "result in unequal
justice before the law."28
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

410 F.2d 325, 331-32 (1969).
Id. at 332-33.
Id. at 333.
458 P.2d 414 (1969).
Id. at 417.
Id. at 418.
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It is within this framework that the United States Supreme Court held last year, in Tate v. Short, 4 that the states
are prohibited by the equal protection clause from imprisonment of indigents for failure to pay fines. And then last
term the Court, in Argersinger, finally reached the logical
conclusion to what it began 40 years ago in Powell v. Alabama:
the extension of right to counsel to misdemeanor, petty offense, and municipal ordinance crimes in state courts.2"
Argersinger v. Hamlin goes far beyond the serious offense standard of Gideon and the six-month imprisonment
standard of Duncan. Under the Argersingor ruling "no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it,
unless the accused is represented by counsel." 26 Al the Justices concurred in the result, but Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell (joined by Justice Rehnquist) expressed serious concerns about how the new rule would be put into action
by the states, from a purely practical standpoint. Undoubtedly, Argersinger does present new problems for the
entire legal system, problems which must be satisfactorily
resolved if the doctrine of right to counsel for all people is
to survive. Chief Justice Burger states that Argersinger,
"[M] ay well add large new burdens on a profession already
overtaxed, but the dynamics of the profession have a way of
rising to the burdens placed on it.""
An immediate problem is whether Argersinger, in conjunction with Tate v. Short, creates the "inverse discrimijnation" spoken of by the Tate Court.2" In Tate, the Court held
that the poor can not be imprisoned for failure to pay fines.
The Tate holding apparently eliminated, for poor persons, the
fine part of "imprisonment-and/or-fine" penalties, unless
the states were willing to impose fines payable in small installments.29 The Argersinger holding eliminates the imprisonment part of such penalties, unless counsel was appointed before trial. It would thus appear that the courts are
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

401 U.S. 395 (1971).
Argersinger, supra note 1, at 2013.
Id. at 2014.
Id. at 2015.
Tate, supra note 24, at 399.
Id. at 399-400.
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left with only two alternatives in indigent cases: (1) if they
choose not to appoint counsel in advance, the only penalty
they can impose is a fine payable in small installments; (2)
if they choose to appoint counsel in advance, they can only
impose a jail sentence or a fine as limited by Tate. The Tate
holding, however, is restricted in application to "poor persons." Thus, for example, a member of the lower middle
class, unrepresented by counsel at trial, might have to pay
a $1,000 fine or be jailed, whereas the indigent without counsel at trial would be allowed to pay off his fine at something
like $2 per week.
Something must be done to avoid such blatant "inverse
discrimination." One suggestion would be to establish a
statewide ability-to-pay schedule for the computation of
amounts owed on installments, for the payment of all fines.
Abiity-to-pay schedules work quite well for such sociallyoriented programs as Mental Health Centers, and there seems
to be no reason why they could not work equally well for the
courts. Such a plan would have several assets. It would
greatly simplify the assessment of fines. It would mean that
fewer contempt proceedings would be necessary (because
more defendants would be able to pay their fines). It would
be more fair than drawing arbitrary poverty lines and would
help to prevent middle-class resentments of the rights of the
poor. It might also relieve the courts of some of the pressure
to appoint counsel arising from the fear that the penalty
imposed must be imprisonment or the defendant will go
unpunished.
Even if ability-to-pay legislation could be enacted, the
states are still left with severe problems of financing, manpower shortage and other much-needed legislative changes,
if right to counsel is to be a truly successful legal precept.
As one commentator said, "[I]t seems impossible responsibly
to ignore the financial and manpower demands on the legal
system that strict equality might impose. The administration
of justice is not advanced by promising more than it can
deliver. ""
30. Junker, supra note 14, at 715.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss1/14

6

Ames: Constitutional Law - Right of Indigents to Counsel to Misdemeanor

1973

CASE NOTES

An examination of the situation in Wyoming should illustrate some of the post-Argersinger problems faced by the
states. A study made after the Gideon decision revealed that
it was not the practice of the Wyoming courts to assign counsel to indigents in misdemeanor cases." Only in Albany
County was there any assignment of counsel to indigent misdemeants, and then only in extraordinary or high misdemeanor cases.8" A survey taken by the author of the study,
John 0. Rames, showed that the great majority of Wyoming
judges, prosecuting attorneys, and defense attorneys were
against providing counsel in misdemeanor cases, because
they felt that the financial and management problems would
outweigh any benefit to the poor." Yet now, by virtue of
Argersinger, these are burdens which must be met by the
Wyoming legal structure. There is no doubt that they will
be met with as much dignity as is possible under the circumstances. The Rules of the Wyoming Bar state, "The bench
and bar are primarily responsible for providing competent
legal services for all persons, including those unable to
pay ... ."" This was written long before Argersinger, and
even before Gideon. It is a strong indication that the Wyoming Bar is as aware as the United States Supreme Court
of the importance of equality of justice, and the need to allow
the poor, as well as the rich, the opportunity to appear in
court without losing their sense of self-worth, to have an attorney as a buffer between them and the feelings of hopelessness and frustration that come with being confronted by a
legal system incomprehensible to the average layman.
Nevertheless, despite the Bar's early recognition of its
responsibilities for providing counsel to the poor, Wyoming
does not have the suitable framework for immediate instigation of a total right-to-counsel program. Wyoming has no
public defender system and most Wyoming communities have
no legal aid society. The maximum fee allowed for a courtappointed lawyer in a misdemeanor case in Wyoming is
31. Rames, Wyoming in 3 DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN AMERICAN COURTS, 813, 818
(Silverstein ed. 1965).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 820-26.
34. 2A Wyo. STAT. Rules for Bar Association, rule 18 (1971 Supp.).
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$100."5 No allowance is made for the attorney's expenses for
investigation, trial preparation, or travel. 6 There is no standard system for appointment of counsel. Generally, the
courts follow a loose alphabetical rotation pattern,8 7 not conducive to achieving optimum defense attorney enthusiasm.
The Rules of the Wyoming Bar allow and encourage the
appearance of eligible law students on behalf of defendants
in criminal cases, 8 a solution suggested by Justice Brennan
in Argersinger However, in any criminal case in which the
accused has the constitutional right to court-appointed counsel, a supervising lawyer must be personally present with the
student throughout the trial.4 0 The geographical location of
the University of Wyoming College of Law, the relatively
small number of eligible law students, and the lack of available funds make it impractical, if not impossible, for law
students and supervising lawyers to make a significant contribution to defense of the poor in more than a limited area
within the state.
OEO Legal Aid programs would probably not be the
answer, even if they were universally accessible in Wyoming.
The Office of Economic Opportunity will not provide funds
to meet the responsibility to furnish counsel for indigent
defendants in criminal prosecutions which the Constitution
imposes on the states except in certain unusual circumstances."
The Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure make no suggestion as to how assignment of counsel is to be accomplished.
To compound the problem, Rule 51(a)4 2 is now clearly in
need of amendment, to assure that the right of counsel
granted by Rule 6(a)4" is also applied to misdemeanant pro85.
86.
37.
88.
39.
40.
41.

WYo. STAT. § 7-9 (Supp. 1971).
Rames, supra note 31, at 819.
Id. at 819.
2A WYO. STAT. Rules for Bar Association, rule 18 (1971 Supp.).
Argersinger, supra note 1, at 2015.
2A Wyo. STAT. Rules for Bar Association, rule 18 (1971 Supp.).
2 CCH POVERTY LAW REP., Guidelines for Legal Services Programs,
8700.36
(1972).
42. WYo. R. CRIM. P. 51(a). Rule 51(a) provides, inter alia, that the Rules of
Criminal Procedure do not apply to misdemeanor proceedings in justice of
the peace courts.
43. Id. at 6(a).
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ceedings in justice of the peace courts. It is obvious that the
Legislature, as well as the Bar, must rise to the occasion. It
should repeal statutes rendered unconstitutional by Argersinger, and pass new legislation, such as the ability-to-pay
scheduling for assessment of all fines, to aid the courts in
meeting their new responsibilities. Above all, the legislature
should authorize the establishment of a public defender
system in Wyoming, equivalent in funding and manpower
to the corresponding prosecuting attorneys offices, for only
such a public defender system can adequately handle the
counseling burden created by Argersinger.
In an article cited by the Court in Argersinger, Professor
John M. Junker observed:
[I]n every relevant sense, the indigent misdemeanant is indistinguishable from the indigent... (felon].
Neither is capable, unaided, of providing the kind
of challenge that has traditionally been considered
essential to assure both the reliability of the criminal process and the containment of governmental
power."
Now the United States Supreme Court has recognized this
fact, and made it the law of the land. But the law, to have
efficacy, awaits proper implementation by the states. It is
a noble law, worthy of all the great sacrifice it may demand.
Whether it will ever be a really workable law depends upon
the concerted and cooperative efforts of judges, lawyers, and
legislatures.
LYNN 0.

AMES

44. Junker, supra note 14, at 686.
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